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BENCHMARKING THE PRODUCTION OF AUDIT SERVICES 
AN EFFICIENCY FRONTIER APPROACH 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
To compete effectively in an increasingly competitive audit market audit firms need 
information on the efficiency of the audit services they offer. This study reports on the cost 
and labor efficiency for a sample of 114 audit engagements conducted by one of the (then) 
Big 6 audit firms. Estimating the efficiency of audit engagements is a form of benchmarking, 
of which economics oriented research has seen many applications. The application to 
auditing however is, as far as we know, relatively new. To determine the cost and labor 
efficiency of the audit engagements we employ the statistical technique of stochastic frontier 
estimation. Using models from the well-known and established audit fee and audit production 
literature we find that for our sample, audit services are produced in a cost and labor efficient 
manner. 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: accounting and auditing, economics; audit production, cost and labor efficiency, 
stochastic frontier estimation 
 
Data availability: The data used in this study are proprietary to the audit firm studied and 
cannot be released by the authors. 
 
 
 
1  
BENCHMARKING THE PRODUCTION OF AUDIT SERVICES 
AN EFFICIENCY FRONTIER APPROACH 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The audit services market is becoming increasingly competitive. To offer audit services at 
competitive prices, information on the costs of conducting audit engagements is essential. 
More specifically, given a specific level of audit quality, audit firms need to know the 
minimum amount of costs necessary to effectuate particular audit engagements. In other 
words, information on the cost efficiency of audit engagements is wanted. Since audit firms 
are professional service organizations whose most important input is human capital, the 
majority of the costs associated with audit engagements consist of costs for use of labor 
hours. This implies that audit firms also need information on (the minimum amount of) labor 
hours to compete effectively with other audit firms on the dimension of audit pricing.  
This study investigates the cost and labor efficiency for a sample of audit engagements 
conducted by one of the (then) Big 6 audit firms employing an efficiency frontier technique 
known as stochastic frontier estimation. Using efficiency frontier techniques is a form of 
relative performance evaluation (RPE). In applying RPE, information about the performance 
of other parties is used in assessing the performance of specific parties1 (Dopuch and Gupta 
1997, 142). This is frequently termed “benchmarking”. Translated to the current study, we 
use information about the performance of other audits to evaluate the performance of a 
specific audit. 
Managerial and financial accounting research, and economics oriented research in general, 
has shown a wide area of benchmarking and RPE applications, in public and in private 
sectors, in manufacturing and in service organizations, at micro (individual employees, 
operational processes, organizational departments and branches, entire organizations), meso 
(industries) and macro levels (countries). Examples include executive compensation based on 
RPE (e.g. Lanen and Larcker 1992), cost and productive efficiencies of banks (Sherman and 
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Gold 1985), cost efficiency of public schools (Dopuch and Gupta 1997), performance of local 
governments (de Borger and Kerstens 1996), performance of private and public utilities (Färe 
et al. 1985), efficiency of hospitals (Grosskopf and Valdmanis 1987), efficiency of labor use 
in insurance offices (Kubhamkar and Hjalmarsson 1995), and efficiency of European railway 
companies (Pestieau 1993).  
To our knowledge, however, the application of benchmarking and RPE to auditing is 
relatively new. There is a substantial body of research investigating the pricing of audit 
services and, to a lesser extent, the production of audit services (see our discussion in the next 
section). All of these studies implicitly assume that audit firms produce their services in an 
efficient manner and thus at minimum costs, as evidenced by the statistical techniques they 
employ. After all, least squares regression fits a line through the center of a scatter plot, thus 
allowing to determine the average amount of audit effort needed to complete an audit for a 
particular client, or the average amount of costs incurred in conducting audits. Regression 
techniques, however, cannot be employed to determine the minimum amount of audit effort 
or the minimum amount of costs necessary to conduct an audit and are therefore unable to 
determine the (relative) efficiency of audit production and audit costs. The efficiency frontier 
techniques which we referred to earlier (and which we will discuss further in a subsequent 
section) are able to do so. Therefore we use an efficiency frontier technique to determine the 
(labor and cost) efficiency of audit services production.  
As far as we know, only one other study has applied benchmarking and RPE to audit 
services. Employing a data set from the late 1980s, Dopuch et al. (2000) use two efficiency 
frontier techniques − the statistical technique stochastic frontier estimation and the linear 
programming technique data envelopment analysis − to determine the minimum amount of 
audit effort, disaggregated by staff level, required for the production of audit services, as well 
as the minimum amount of (a surrogate of) audit costs associated with this production.2 As 
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Dopuch et al. (2000) indicate, studying each individual staff level separately provides 
information on the (in)efficiencies of labor for each of these individual staff levels. However, 
it does not indicate whether the mix of labor hours was efficient as well. Therefore, Dopuch 
et al. use (a surrogate of) audit costs, in addition to audit hours disaggregated by staff level, to 
investigate whether the composition of the audit team in its entirety was efficient. We follow 
Dopuch et al. (2000) in that we use both audit hours disaggregated by staff level and audit 
costs to study the efficiency of the production of audit services. However, our measure of 
audit costs differs from that used by Dopuch et al. (2000). As we will argue in subsequent 
sections, we believe our measure of audit costs presents a more accurate picture of actual 
audit costs incurred by the firm in conducting the audit engagements. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in the following section we review 
prior research on audit pricing and audit production. In subsequent sections we describe the 
data collection, and the variables and model specification used in the study; we discuss 
efficiency frontier techniques in general and stochastic frontier estimation in particular; and 
we present the results of our study. In a final section we summarize and conclude.  
 
PRIOR RESEARCH: AUDIT PRICING, AUDIT PRODUCTION AND THE LABOR 
EFFICIENCY OF AUDIT SERVICES 
As stated earlier, prior research on the labor and cost efficiency of audit services is rather 
limited. In fact, to our knowledge, only one other study (Dopuch et al. 2000) has investigated 
the labor and cost efficiency of audit services. There is, however, a substantial amount of 
research on audit pricing and audit production on which the study by Dopuch et al. (2000) is 
based. Before discussing Dopuch et al. (2000), we will therefore provide a review of this 
research. Although our emphasis will be on audit production studies, we will discuss audit fee 
studies as well. The initial unavailability of data on audit production led researchers to base 
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inferences about audit production on audit fee research. When audit production data did 
become available, audit production models built upon the models used in audit pricing 
studies. This justifies a concise discussion of audit fee studies. 
Simunic (1980) was the first to develop an extensive model of audit fees. In examining the 
competitiveness of the audit market, he hypothesized and found factors relating to auditee 
size, auditee complexity, auditee asset composition, auditee industry, auditee risk and 
financial distress, auditor’s tenure and auditor type (Big 8/6/5 vs. non-Big 8/6/5) to be 
associated with audit fees. Simunic’s study has initiated a large stream of research replicating 
and extending his work. Besides assessing the competitiveness of the audit market (see e.g. 
Francis 1984) these studies have investigated a multitude of issues, such as reputation effects 
(e.g. Craswell et al. 1995), the provision of nonaudit services (e.g. Palmrose 1986b), off-peak 
pricing (e.g. Francis and Stokes 1986); learning over time (e.g. Chung and Lindsay 1988), 
price-cutting (e.g. Simon and Francis 1988), and client participation (e.g. Stein et al. 1994). 
Although the studies’ findings are mixed with respect to some of these issues, in general the 
audit fee model is fairly robust across time periods, countries and sample composition, and a 
number of results are consistent across the majority of audit fee studies. For instance, auditee 
size, auditee complexity, auditee asset composition and auditee financial distress are all 
positively associated with audit fees. Furthermore, Big 8/6/5 auditees pay significantly higher 
fees than do non-Big 8/6/5 auditees.  
Evidence based on audit fees will permit only indirect testing of hypotheses concerning 
the production of audit services. After all, an audit fee is the product of quantity (audit effort 
exerted by various grades of labor) and price per unit of labor category. As a result, a test 
based on audit fees may be confounded by the audit firms’ pricing policies (O’Keefe et al. 
1994, 242). Therefore, a change in audit fees may not reflect pure changes in audit production 
but merely changes in audit pricing. A limited amount of studies have used information on 
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audit effort for testing hypotheses about the production of audit services. In doing so, these 
studies have mainly employed data on client and engagement characteristics that have been 
shown to be important determinants of audit fees in prior research.  
An explanation of the audit production problem is important for our discussion of 
efficiency frontier techniques and stochastic frontier estimation in a later section. We will 
therefore discuss the concept of the audit production problem before we proceed to a review 
of studies on this subject. We base our discussion of the audit production problem on that of 
O’Keefe et al. (1994) and Stein et al. (1994). 
A production function describes the (technical) relationship between the inputs and 
outputs of a production process (Coelli et al. 1998, 12). Inputs specify the amounts of 
resources necessary to produce a given level of output. Applied to the production of audit 
services, the inputs of the audit production process are the units of labor necessary to produce 
a given level of output.3 As for all service organizations, the output of an audit firm is 
difficult to define. O’Keefe et al. (1994, 241) describe the output of the audit production 
process as the level of assurance provided to financial statement users that these financial 
statements are not materially misstated.  
In their application of the audit production model, O’Keefe et al. (1994, 243-244) make 
the following assumptions: (1) the level of assurance produced by an audit firm is not directly 
observable. It is assumed that this assurance level is implied by the audit firm’s brand name; 
(2) any particular audit firm produces a fixed level of assurance at a moment in time. That is, 
a firm’s audit quality level is assumed to be fixed at any moment in time; (3) the client firm’s 
structure is taken as predetermined; (4) a client firm’s owners and managers will select an 
audit firm which will deliver the level of assurance demanded by the client firm; and (5) the 
audit firm operates in a competitive environment, motivating the firm to produce its output at 
minimum cost. 
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Based on these assumptions, O’Keefe et al. (1994) describe the auditor’s decision problem 
as a constrained cost minimization problem for a fixed level of assurance (Hackenbrack and 
Knechel 1997, 485). Formally, this can be written as: 
minimize c(h, γ) 
 
such that q = p(h, γ) 
 
with: 
c(·) audit cost function 
h   vector of audit service inputs 
γ  vector of exogenous client firm characteristics 
q  level of assurance associated with the audit firm’s brand name 
p(·) audit production function 
 
The inclusion of client characteristics in the above cost and production functions is common 
for service organizations (Fuchs 1968, 194; O’Keefe et al. 1994, 244). 
Assuming that an audit firm’s assurance level is fixed at a certain point in time, and that 
this level of assurance can in fact be produced by the audit firm in question, the optimum 
combination of audit services inputs h* at that point in time can be estimated from the 
following equation: 
 
h* = p-1 (q, γ) 
 
Under the assumption that an audit firm operates in a competitive market, this solution 
implies the following minimum cost level for the fixed level of assurance q: 
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c(h*, γ) 
 
Be it implicitly or explicitly, all studies reviewed below apply the audit production problem 
outlined above and use the audit production equation h* as defined above. 
Compared to audit fee studies, the number of audit production studies conducted to date is 
more limited. The earliest production studies use total audit hours spent on an engagement as 
the dependent variable and include as independent variables those client characteristics 
influencing audit quantity (see Palmrose 1986a, 1989; Davis et al. 1993; Davidson and Gist 
1996). Generalizing the results, these studies consistently find that factors important in 
explaining variation in audit fees are also important in explaining variation in audit hours. A 
number of other production studies extend these studies by using audit hours disaggregated 
by staff level (O’Keefe et al. 1994; Stein et al. 1994; and Bell et al. 1994), or audit hours 
disaggregated by staff level and audit activity (Hackenbrack and Knechel 1997). According 
to O’Keefe et al. (1994, 245), the use of aggregate hours spent on engagements is 
inappropriate when factors have differential effects on the various types of labor. Using 
disaggregated hours allows to investigate whether (and which) factors impact on the amount, 
as well as the mix of labor resources. Again, these studies find that factors relating to auditee 
size, complexity and risk that were important determinants of audit fees are important 
determinants of audit hours as well. In addition, they find that certain size and risk measures 
also significantly influence the mix of labor resources.  
 Dopuch et al. (2000) is the only study conducted to date that, to our knowledge, explicitly 
investigates the issue of efficiency in the production of audit services. To the same data set 
used in O’Keefe et al. (1994), Stein et al. (1994) and Bell et al. (1994) they apply the 
efficiency frontier techniques of stochastic frontier estimation (SFE) and data envelopment 
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analysis (DEA) to measure the relative efficiency of audit labor hours per staff level as well 
as (a surrogate of) audit costs.4 As has been referred to in the Introduction and as will be 
argued in a later section, the characteristics and assumptions of ordinary least squares 
regression techniques (used by all other studies discussed above) render this technique 
unsuitable for detecting possible inefficiencies in the production of audit services, in contrast 
to efficiency frontier techniques such as SFE and DEA. The SFE and DEA results of Dopuch 
et al. (2000) are rather contradictory: whereas the SFE results suggest that there are no labor 
or cost inefficiencies in the production of audit services, the DEA results suggest the 
opposite. To a large extent, we believe this difference in result may be explained by the 
differences between the two efficiency frontier techniques. The specifics of efficiency 
frontier estimation will be discussed in a later section. Suffice it to state here that SFE 
measures the relative efficiency a production process by assuming that the error term consists 
of two independent sources of errors: a one-sided error (truncated from below at zero) 
representing inefficiency, and a symmetric error representing random variation from the so-
called efficiency frontier.5 Whereas SFE assumes that deviations from the frontier may 
consist of inefficiencies as well as random noise, DEA assumes that all deviations from the 
frontier represent inefficiencies. Therefore, application of DEA may result in more deviations 
from the frontier being labeled as inefficiencies than when SFE is used (Schmidt 1985-86, 
304 and 319).  
 
DATA COLLECTION, VARIABLES AND MODEL 
We obtained our data from a survey among engagement partners of a (then) Big 6 audit firm. 
Based on an extensive review of prior audit fee and production studies (see prior section), we 
designed the survey instrument in cooperation with the technical department of the audit firm, 
which also administered the survey. The instrument−in the form of an electronic 
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spreadsheet−was sent to the audit engagement partners of each of the firm’s offices and was 
accompanied by a cover letter and an instruction. Prior to conducting the actual survey, 
instrument, cover letter and instruction were pilot tested. Some minor adjustments were 
made.6  
 Great care was taken to obtain high quality data. The instruction accompanying the survey 
instrument specified selection criteria for the engagements to be included in the sample, and 
contained directions for filling out the spreadsheet.  
 The selection criteria indicated that the engagements to be included in the sample: (1) are 
financial statement audits. Reviews, compilations or special assignments are not to be 
considered; (2) pertain to the most recent audit; (3) concern clients in for-profit sectors. Prior 
audit fee research has shown that fee models for not-for-profit organizations differ from those 
using data from profit organizations (see e.g. Baber et al. 1987; Rubin 1988; Ward et al. 
1994; Sanders et al. 1995); (4) do not concern clients in the financial services industry. 
Again, prior studies have found that fee and production models differ significantly between 
financial service industry clients and clients in other industries (see Simunic 1980; Simunic 
1984; Palmrose 1986a, 1986b, 1989; Turpen 1990; Stein et al. 1994). No other restrictions as 
to the client’s industry were imposed; (5) concern publicly and privately held companies 
subject to a statutory audit requirement; (6) do not concern clients that are included in the 
Amsterdam Exchanges Index (AEX) or the Amsterdam Midkap Index (AMX). Together, 
these indexes are comprised of the 50 most actively traded shares on the Amsterdam Stock 
exchange and include companies like Heineken, KLM and Philips. Many are fairly unique in 
their own right, rendering these companies unsuitable for our purposes since application of 
RPE and benchmarking requires observations that are comparable to some extent (Dopuch 
and Gupta 1997, 142); (7) relate to clients that publish independent financial statements; and 
(8) are audits of either independent companies or subsidiaries. Holding companies should not 
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be selected. The rationale for this last criterion is that the audit hour and audit cost data on the 
one hand and the data on client characteristics on the other hand need to concern one and the 
same entity. Audits of holding companies are often conducted in cooperation with other 
offices of the firm, either within the same country or abroad, or with other audit firms. In 
such cases, especially obtaining all relevant hour and cost data is relatively complicated and 
may result in inaccurate data.  
 The directions for filling out the questionnaire asked the partners to retrieve the requested 
data from the firm’s internal billing records (which contains data on audit hours, internal 
billing rates and fees) and the firm’s electronic filing system (in which all kinds of client 
characteristics are recorded during the performance of audits). In addition, the directions 
clarified which particular data were to be collected, so as to minimize ambiguities. 
Furthermore, the partners were told that we would not be informed about the identity of the 
individual clients. 
Each of the 25 offices of the firm received a request to supply data on 25 audit 
engagements, 18 offices agreed to participate, resulting in a total of 157 responses. Of these, 
114 responses are used in the analyses. Four responses are not usable because they do not 
meet the selection criteria discussed above7, and 39 responses have missing values. 
 Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the 114 observations used in the analyses.  
[Table 1 here] 
The selection of variables included in our analyses is based on a review of prior audit fee and 
audit production literature (see previous section) and concerns factors related to client size, 
client complexity, client asset composition, client risk and financial distress, quality of client 
internal controls, auditor’s tenure, and the auditor’s provision of nonaudit services. 
 The model specification we use in our study is also based on those used in previous audit 
fee and production research.8 For audit hours, the model is as follows:  
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ln hj = βj0 + βj1 ln A + βj2 ln R + βj3 ln L + Σ βji γi + εi (1) 
 
In this formulation, hj represents the actual number of audit hours spent on an audit by the jth 
staff level, A indicates client size, R number of reports provided to the management by the 
auditor, L the number of client locations visited during the audit, and γi represents all other 
client characteristics as shown in Table 1.  
We use a similar model for our cost function:  
ln c = β0 + β1 ln A + β2 ln R + β3 ln L + Σ βi γi + εi (2) 
 
where c represents the total audit costs incurred by the audit firm for a specific audit, and all 
other variables are defined as above. Total audit costs per engagement consist of the 
following components: (1) actual number of audit hours spent per staff level, times the 
internal hourly rate differentiated per staff level per engagement, summed over all staff 
levels; and (2) out-of-pocket costs (see Davis et al. 1993, 138). Our measure of audit costs 
differs from the standard fee mentioned in O’Keefe et al. (1994, 248) and used as a surrogate 
for audit costs in Dopuch et al. (2000, 8). This standard fee is described as the product of 
actual hours per staff level multiplied by standard billing rates, summed over all staff levels. 
However, we do not use standard billing rates per staff level, but the actual internal hourly 
rates per staff level charged to each individual audit engagement. Since our data indicate that 
these actual rates per staff level cover a broad range, we consider our use of differentiated 
billing rates to compute audit costs more accurate than that of billing rates per staff level that 
are equal over all engagements.9 In addition, we also include out-of-pocket costs 
(representing costs like travel, lodging and meals, see Davis et al. 1993, 138) incurred per 
engagement in our cost measure. 
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EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES AND STOCHASTIC FRONTIER 
ESTIMATION 
As discussed earlier, a production function describes the (technical) relationship between the 
inputs and outputs of a production process (Coelli et al. 1998, 12). It specifies the maximum 
quantities of realizable output given any level of inputs, or alternatively, for any level of 
output the minimum quantities of inputs needed for producing (Thiry and Tulkens 1989, 22). 
In this context, the production function is also viewed as the frontier of the so-called 
production set (Pestieau 1993, 128; Greene 1997, 85). The elements that constitute this set 
are all the input-output combinations that are physically feasible to the producer. The frontier 
indicates the limits of what is achievable. Feasible productive activities that lie on the frontier 
are efficient, those that lie inside the production set are inefficient. The larger the distance 
from the frontier, the more inefficient the activity (Pestieau 1993, 130). The production 
frontier-function acts as a norm, serving as a base for assessing efficiency (Thiry and Tulkens 
1989, 23). It is to be emphasized that this norm is relative rather than absolute: the degree of 
(in)efficiency of any input-output combination is evaluated relative to the most efficient 
observation in the data set. Therefore, the production frontier is often termed a “best practice” 
frontier (Greene 1997, 98).  
 The production function describing the relationship between inputs and outputs is called 
the primal function. Besides this primal function, one can also estimate the so-called dual 
functions of the production function: cost and profit functions. The choice for either of these 
two depends on the behavioral assumption one makes: cost minimization or profit 
maximization (Coelli et al. 1998, 22-23). As discussed in our prior research section, the audit 
production problem can be characterized as a cost minimization problem.  
 As indicated in the first section of this paper, conventional ordinary least squares 
regression techniques are unable to determine whether an input-output combination is (cost) 
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efficient, and to what extent. Since these techniques fit a line through the center of a scatter 
plot of input-output combinations they can be used to calculate average, but not efficient, 
production and cost levels. So-called efficiency frontier techniques, however, can do so. The 
literature distinguishes along the dimensions parametric–non-parametric and 
deterministic−stochastic (see e.g. Schmidt 1985-86; Knox Lovell and Schmidt 1988; Thiry 
and Tulkens 1989; Pestieau 1993; Greene 1997). 
 Parametric approaches to estimating production or cost frontiers assume a particular 
functional form for the frontier and make use of econometric estimation methods. SFE, 
developed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), is an example of 
a parametric frontier estimation technique. Non-parametric approaches do not require a-priori 
specification of a functional form but rather make use of the formal properties that the points 
in the data set should satisfy, employing mathematical programming techniques. An example 
of the non-parametric approach is DEA, developed by Charnes et al. (1978), which uses 
linear programming techniques to estimate efficiency frontiers.  
 A further distinction is made between deterministic and stochastic frontier estimation 
techniques. Deterministic techniques, such as DEA, take no account of the possible influence 
of measurement error, omitted variables, and other noise upon the frontier. All deviations 
from the frontier (i.e. the error terms) are assumed to be the result of inefficiencies. A more 
realistic approach is taken by stochastic frontier techniques like SFE, which accounts for two 
sources of errors: a one-sided error representing inefficiency, and a symmetric error 
representing random variation of the frontier.  
 In this study we use a parametric frontier technique, more specifically a stochastic frontier 
technique, to estimate production and cost frontiers. We prefer the stochastic to the 
deterministic approach because it takes account of measurement errors, omitted variables and 
other noise. The assumption that the error term is solely composed of inefficiency is unlikely 
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(see Schmidt 1985-86, 308). We also prefer a parametric to a non-parametric approach. A 
major disadvantage of non-parametric techniques is the inability to conduct conventional 
tests of hypotheses (Greene 1997, 93; Coelli et al. 1998, 245). In contrast, a parametric 
technique does allow for statistical inference since it employs econometric estimation 
methods. We acknowledge the often-mentioned disadvantage of parametric techniques of the 
need to specify a functional form for the production and cost function (see Coelli et al. 1998, 
246). However, as do Dopuch et al. (2000, 10), we feel that this is not a serious problem since 
the relationship between audit fees (and to a lesser extent, audit hours) and client and 
engagement characteristics has been studied extensively, resulting in a robust log-linear 
specification of this relationship. Another often-quoted disadvantage of parametric techniques 
concerns the need to specify a distributional form for the inefficiency term. We believe this 
not to be a major problem in our study, since our analyses in the subsequent section show that 
the results are not likely to be dependent on the distributional form of the inefficiency term.  
 In conventional ordinary least squares regression, the error term εi in the production and 
cost functions as defined in a prior section is assumed to consist of pure noise, being 
randomly distributed with mean zero and variance σε2. In contrast, and as stated, the 
stochastic frontier technique assumes that εi is composed of two sources of errors: vi + ui The 
first element vi is similar to the interpretation of εi in ordinary least squares regression, 
representing measurement error, omitted variables and other noise, and is assumed to be 
independent and identically distributed with mean zero and variance σv2. This random error is 
assumed to be distributed independently of the second element, ui, a one-sided error 
representing inefficiency. This latter error is also assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed, following a half-normal distribution (truncated from below at zero)10 with mean 
zero and variance σu2. Both vi en ui are assumed to be distributed independently of the 
independent variables in the frontier production or cost model.  
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 To determine whether the stochastic frontier model is a better representation of the 
production process and the resulting cost structure than the ordinary least squares regression 
model, we need to test if there are in fact labor and/or cost inefficiencies in the models 
specified. This involves testing the null hypothesis H0: σu2=0 versus the alternative 
hypothesis H1: σu2>0. Acceptance of H0 would mean that there are no (labor or cost) 
inefficiencies in the model, implying that the ordinary least squares regression model 
provides a valid representation of the production process or cost structure in that there are no 
inefficiencies present. Instead, rejection of H0 would indicate that indeed there are 
inefficiencies in the production process or cost structure, leading one to conclude that the 
stochastic frontier model is to be preferred over the ordinary least squares regression model. 
 
RESULTS 
The following disaggregated staff levels are studied in our analyses: (1) partner; (2) manager; 
(3) supervisor; (4) assistant; and (5) supporting activities. The latter category differs from the 
first four in that in contrast to the partners, managers, supervisors and assistants, the 
employees performing the supporting activities are not part of the audit team. Conducting 
mostly secretarial and related activities, their duties are less of an audit nature than are those 
of the other levels. We therefore expect our model to be less suited for this category than for 
all other categories. We do, however, include this category in our analysis to provide a 
complete picture of the audit production process and the related cost structure.  
 Besides labor hours disaggregated by staff level, we also perform our analyses for two 
composite measures, total audit costs and total audit hours. A definition of total audit costs 
was provided in our section on data collection, variables and model. Total audit hours is 
simply an unweighted sum of the labor hours per staff level spent on a specific engagement.  
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OLS Regressions Results and Tests 
Table 2 presents the results of the OLS regression of the dependent variables on the 
independent variables that were presented and defined in Table 1.  
[Table 2 here] 
Examination of pairwise correlations among the independent variables and of the variance-
inflating factors (Gujarati 1995, 328) shows that multicollinearity is not a problem.11 Since 
application of Breusch-Pagan tests (Greene 2000, 509-510) indicate presence of 
heteroscedasticity for the models for total costs, total hours, partner hours, supervisor hours 
and assistant hours, the t-ratios presented for these regressions are computed using White’s 
heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimation method.  
 The table shows that the models are significant at the 0.01 level, except for supporting 
activities. This latter result does not surprise us considering the deviant nature of the activities 
of this staff level compared to the other levels. The regression for supporting activities also 
has the lowest explanatory power of all models presented as evidenced by its adjusted R2. All 
other models have an adjusted R2 that is well inside the range of those reported by prior audit 
production studies (see the section on prior research for these studies). What is striking 
though, is that the explanatory power of models for total audit costs and for total audit hours 
is much higher than for the disaggregated measures. Apparently, our specification better 
explains the composite measures than the constituent parts of these measures.  
 Turning to the independent variables, we see that our results confirm prior audit 
production studies in that measures of client size, client complexity, client asset composition, 
client risk and financial distress, quality of client internal controls, auditor’s tenure, and the 
auditor’s provision of nonaudit services are determinants of total audit costs, total audit hours 
and at least some category of disaggregated labor hours. Also in line with prior research, 
client size (in the form of assets) seems to be the most important determinant of audit costs 
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and (aggregated and disaggregated) audit hours.12 Table 2 also shows that the results for 
some variables are inconsistent with our expectation in that they have a sign opposite to the 
one we expected (when these effects are statistically significant, they are in bold face type). 
For the supervisor level, an other than unqualified opinion seems to decrease rather than 
increase the number of audit hours spent. Also, auditor learning does not appear to take place 
in a consistent manner13 as evidenced by the significant negative signs of the second year 
client indicator for total audit hours, and the fact that for most models the coefficients for the 
tenure indicators are not significantly different.14 Finally, for the manager level, higher 
quality of internal controls appears to increase rather than decrease the number of audit hours. 
Removal of outliers identified by robust regression (Berk 1990) did not change these 
findings. The overall regression results after removal of outliers were qualitatively similar to 
those before removal of outliers.  
 
Stochastic Frontier Estimation Results and Tests 
We have estimated the stochastic frontier specification of the cost and production models 
using the program Frontier 4.1 (Coelli 1996). This program employs the method of maximum 
likelihood estimation to obtain the vector of parameters of the models.  
 Table 3 reports the results for the estimation of the stochastic frontier models for each of 
the composite measures total audit costs and total audit hours, and the disaggregated labor 
hours. For ease of comparison, the OLS results are presented alongside the stochastic frontier 
estimation (SFE) results.  
[Table 3 here] 
The table shows that the OLS and SFE results are virtually identical. First of all, there are 
essentially no differences in the intercepts and coefficient parameters and the associated 
levels of significance between OLS and SFE for each of the equations. Second, the test of H0: 
18  
σu
2=0 versus H1: σu2>0 indicates acceptance of H0, implying indifference between the OLS 
and the SFE specification of the cost and production models.15 Taken together, these findings 
suggest that there are no cost and labor inefficiencies in the production of audit services, in 
that − at least for these particular clients of this particular audit firm at this particular point in 
time − these services could not have been produced for less costs and with less labor hours. 
Our results match the SFE results, but not the DEA results, of Dopuch et al. (2000). As 
discussed in an earlier section, Dopuch et al. (2000) do not find inefficiencies in the 
production of audit services when using SFE. In contrast, results using DEA do show 
inefficiencies in this production. As stated, we believe this difference between SFE and DEA 
results is largely due to the differences between the two frontier techniques.  
Cost and labor efficient audit services fit with the representation of the audit market as (price) 
competitive, disciplining auditors to conduct audits efficiently. Still, we find our results 
surprising, considering “..(…) the complexity of the audit process, diversity in the knowledge 
of auditors, and the fact that client characteristics vary a great deal from engagement to 
engagement.(…)” (Dopuch et al. 2000).  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The aim of the current paper was to benchmark the production of audit services by 
investigating the cost and labor efficiency of a sample of (then) Big 6 audit engagements 
using the statistical technique of stochastic frontier estimation. The results show that our 
model specification of audit production performs in a fashion similar to those of prior audit 
production studies, in that (1) measures of client size, client complexity, client asset 
composition, client risk and financial distress, quality of client internal controls, auditor’s 
tenure, and the auditor’s provision of nonaudit services are shown to be important 
determinants of audit costs and audit production; and (2) client size is the single most 
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important factor explaining audit costs and audit production. In addition, our results suggest 
that prior audit fee and production model specifications also provide good explanatory power 
for a model of audit costs, a model that to our knowledge only Davis et al. (1993) has 
tested16, finding a much lower adjusted R2.  
 Turning to our results for the estimation of efficiency, our findings are similar to the SFE 
results, but opposite to the DEA results of Dopuch et al. (2000), the only other study that to 
our knowledge has investigated the labor and costs efficiency of audit services, in that we 
find that for our sample audits are labor and cost efficient. Given the nature of the audit 
production process, we are surprised to find these results. Apparently, the claimed (price-
)competitiveness of the audit market has disciplined the auditors into cost and labor 
efficiency. As a marginal but important note, it has to be stated that anecdotal evidence 
suggests that auditors frequently engage in underreporting of time to meet time budgets, a 
suggestion also confirmed by research (see Kelley and Margheim 1987, 1990; Otley and 
Pierce 1996; Akers et al. 1998-99). If this were also true for the auditors in our sample, our 
findings would suggest that hours are consistently underreported for all clients, and that the 
firm’s many years’ audit experience has at least rendered their audit budget efficient. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for 114 financial statement audits 
       
 Mean Std. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum  
       
Continuous variables       
Total audit costs (in NLG) 90,866.28 147,262.40 56,237.50 14,525.00 1,248,970.00  
Total audit hours 477.24 631.10 346.38 79.00 5,388.00  
Total partner hours 22.40 35.21 11.50 1.00 205.00  
Total manager hours 56.44 132.93 27.00 2.00 1,161.00  
Total supervisor hours 134.31 256.48 86.00 1.00 2,635.00  
Total assistant hours 256.30 279.11 198.00 28.50 2,601.00  
Total supporting hours 12.79 20.45 6.00 1.00 149.00  
Assets (in NLG 000's) 190,000.00 792,000.00 32,800.00 4,633.29 6,870,000.00  
Nr. of reports provided to management 1.99 1.61 2.00 1.00 12.00  
Nr. of locations visited by the auditor during the audit 2.00 2.65 1.00 1.00 25.00  
Foreign proportion of assets 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.00 1.00  
Leverage (Long term liabilities/Total assets) 0.12 0.17 0.03 0.00 0.82  
(Receivables + Inventory)/Total assets 0.56 0.26 0.59 0.04 1.91 # 
Profit margin (Net result/Total sales) 0.04 0.08 0.03 -0.33 0.51  
Nonaudit fee/audit fee 0.46 0.91 0.16 0.00 6.20  
       
Categorical variables       
Opinion type: (0,1), where 1 indicates other than unqualified opinion 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00  
First year client: (0,1), where 1 indicates a first year client 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00 1.00  
Second year client: (0,1), where 1 indicates a second year client 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00  
Third year client: (0,1), where 1 indicates a third year client 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00  
Fourth year client: (0,1), where 1 indicates a fourth year client 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00  
Inherent risk: (0,1), where 1 indicates greater than average risk 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00  
Control quality : (0,1), where 1 indicates higher than average quality 0.61 0.49 1.00 0.00 1.00  
Loss in last two years: (0,1) where 1 indicates an operating loss in the  0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 1.00  
  last two years       
Public: (0,1), where 1 indicates a public company 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00  
       
# In a number of cases cash had a negative sign, causing the ratio (Receivables + inventory)/Total assets to exceed one.  
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Table 2 
OLS regression of (natural logs of) total audit costs, total audit hours and disaggregate audit hours on client characteristics for 114 financial statement audits 
                       
               
Independent variables: 
Expect.  
sign Total costs1 Total hours1 Partner hours1 Manager hours Supervisor hours1 Assistant hours1 Supporting hours 
  coeff. t-ratio  coeff. t-ratio  coeff. t-ratio  coeff. t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio  coeff. t-ratio  coeff. t-ratio  
Intercept ? -- 2 -- 2 *** 0.965 1.231  -1.315 -0.543  -6.501 -2.524 ** -3.733 -1.475  1.660 1.501  -3.334 -1.538  
Assets (natural log) + 0.322 6.930 *** 0.268 5.687 *** 0.206 1.347 * 0.494 3.353 *** 0.410 2.633 *** 0.196 2.925 *** 0.323 2.604 *** 
Nr. of reports (natural log) + 0.209 2.122 *** 0.194 1.993 ** 0.186 0.798  0.300 0.875  -0.075 -0.293  0.174 1.331 * 0.134 0.464  
Nr. of locations (natural log) + 0.292 3.446 *** 0.287 3.429 *** 0.239 1.235  0.810 2.811 *** 0.321 1.312 * 0.253 2.357 *** 0.029 0.120  
Opinion type + 0.001 0.008  -0.070 -0.476  -0.278 -0.679  1.458 1.839 ** -1.481 -1.789 * -0.086 -0.312  -0.376 -0.564  
Foreign proportion of assets + 0.584 1.488 * 0.534 1.338 * 1.826 1.979 ** 2.033 1.344 * -0.304 -0.195  0.415 0.710  -1.273 -1.000  
Leverage + -0.331 -1.095  -0.235 -0.822  0.582 0.900  -0.458 -0.428  1.024 1.409 * -0.242 -0.661  -0.678 -0.754  
First year client + -0.249 -1.163  -0.070 -0.334  -0.832 -2.701 *** -0.787 -0.618  -1.442 -1.487  0.297 1.409 * 0.373 0.348  
Second year client + -0.391 -1.482  -0.453 -1.714 * -0.204 -0.596  -0.163 -0.206  -0.754 -1.105  -0.297 -1.227  -0.453 -0.680  
Third year client + -0.056 -0.356  0.042 0.263  -0.082 -0.200  -0.159 -0.227  0.350 1.181  0.179 0.880  0.363 0.616  
Fourth year client + 0.370 1.342 * 0.318 1.191  0.709 1.747 ** -0.309 -0.388  0.669 1.863 ** 0.256 0.823  0.130 0.195  
(Receivables + Inventory)/Total assets + -0.005 -0.031  -0.027 -0.155  -0.342 -0.724  -0.358 -0.475  1.198 2.089 ** -0.187 -0.761  -0.257 -0.407  
Profit margin - -1.185 -1.349 * -1.149 -1.295 * -3.172 -2.075 ** -1.920 -0.671  -6.095 -2.751 *** 0.157 0.141  -0.070 -0.029  
Nonaudit fee/audit fee - -0.086 -1.361 * -0.064 -0.986  -0.019 -0.199  -0.125 -0.706  0.062 0.711  -0.053 -0.746  -0.281 -1.894 ** 
Inherent risk + 0.159 1.337 * 0.163 1.336 * 0.474 1.360 * 0.051 0.094  0.092 0.259  0.052 0.238  0.210 0.462  
Control quality - 0.097 1.109  0.085 0.968  0.075 0.340  0.586 1.780 * 0.045 0.150  0.123 1.096  -0.460 -1.661 ** 
Loss in last two years + 0.240 2.270 ** 0.255 2.259 ** -0.124 -0.286  -0.284 -0.476  0.427 1.100  0.429 2.613 *** 0.072 0.144  
Public + 0.017 0.128  -0.017 -0.138  0.357 1.250  -0.067 -0.143  0.091 0.211  0.042 0.272  -0.213 -0.538  
                       
Overall F-test  16.98 ***  13.77 ***  19.58 ***  3.90 ***  6.39 ***  7.67 ***  1.13   
Adjusted R2  0.75   0.69   0.27   0.30   0.27   0.44   0.02   
                       
1 t-statistics are calculated using White's correction for heteroskedasticity 
2 Intercept deleted at the request of the firm providing our data 
Significance: * p <.10 level , ** p <.05 level, *** p <.01 level (tested one or two tailed, where appropriate) 
Note: coefficients and t-ratios that have a sign opposite to its predicted sign and that are significant at the above-indicated levels are in bold face. 
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Table 3 
Efficiency of total audit costs, total audit hours and disaggregate audit hours for 114 financial statement audits 
        
Panel A: total audit costs        
        
Dependent variable: natural log of total audit costs Expected        
Independent variables: sign OLS1   SFE   
  coefficient t-ratio  coefficient t-ratio  
Intercept ? --2 --2 *** --2 --2 *** 
Assets (natural log) + 0.322 6.930 *** 0.322 9.801 *** 
Nr. of reports (natural log) + 0.209 2.122 *** 0.209 2.738 *** 
Nr. of locations (natural log) + 0.292 3.446 *** 0.292 4.543 *** 
Opinion type + 0.001 0.008  0.001 0.007  
Foreign proportion of assets + 0.584 1.488 * 0.584 1.699 ** 
Leverage + -0.331 -1.095  -0.331 -1.393  
First year client + -0.249 -1.163  -0.249 -0.875  
Second year client + -0.391 -1.482  -0.391 -2.201 ** 
Third year client + -0.056 -0.356  -0.056 -0.355  
Fourth year client + 0.370 1.342 * 0.370 2.080 ** 
(Receivables + Inventory)/Total assets + -0.005 -0.031  -0.005 -0.032  
Profit margin - -1.185 -1.349 * -1.185 -1.808 ** 
Nonaudit fee/audit fee - -0.086 -1.361 * -0.086 -2.202 ** 
Inherent risk + 0.159 1.337 * 0.159 1.326 * 
Control quality - 0.097 1.109  0.097 1.314  
Loss in last two years + 0.240 2.270 ** 0.240 1.801 ** 
Public + 0.017 0.128  0.017 0.161  
        
Overall F-test  16.98 ***     
Adjusted R2  0.75      
Log likelihood constant only  -130.781   -125.031   
Log likelihood model  -43.291   -43.291   
Likelihood ratio test statistic  174.980 ***  163.480 ***  
        
Log likelihood OLS model  -43.291      
Log likelihood SFE model  -43.291      
Likelihood ratio test statistic OLS vs. SFE3  0.000      
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Table 3-continued 
        
Panel B: total audit hours        
        
Dependent variable: natural log of total audit hours Expected        
Independent variables: sign OLS1   SFE   
  coefficient t-ratio  coefficient t-ratio  
Intercept ? 0.965 1.231  0.963 1.286  
Assets (natural log) + 0.268 5.687 *** 0.268 8.263 *** 
Nr. of reports (natural log) + 0.194 1.993 ** 0.194 2.556 *** 
Nr. of locations (natural log) + 0.287 3.429 *** 0.287 4.493 *** 
Opinion type + -0.070 -0.476  -0.070 -0.400  
Foreign proportion of assets + 0.534 1.338 * 0.534 1.622 * 
Leverage + -0.235 -0.822  -0.235 -1.018  
First year client + -0.070 -0.334  -0.070 -0.249  
Second year client + -0.453 -1.714 * -0.453 -2.584 ** 
Third year client + 0.042 0.263  0.042 0.269  
Fourth year client + 0.318 1.191  0.318 1.811 ** 
(Receivables + Inventory)/Total assets + -0.027 -0.155  -0.027 -0.161  
Profit margin - -1.149 -1.295 * -1.149 -1.870 ** 
Nonaudit fee/audit fee - -0.064 -0.986  -0.064 -1.657 * 
Inherent risk + 0.163 1.336 * 0.163 1.365 * 
Control quality - 0.085 0.968  0.085 1.161  
Loss in last two years + 0.255 2.259 ** 0.255 1.938 ** 
Public + -0.017 -0.138  -0.017 -0.165  
        
Overall F-test  13.77 ***     
Adjusted R2  0.69      
Log likelihood constant only  -118.966   -114.728   
Log likelihood model  -42.569   -42.569   
Likelihood ratio test statistic  152.795 ***  144.319 ***  
        
Log likelihood OLS model  -42.569      
Log likelihood SFE model  -42.569      
Likelihood ratio test statistic OLS vs. SFE3  0.000      
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Table 3-continued 
        
Panel C: partner hours        
        
Dependent variable: natural log of partner hours Expected        
Independent variables: sign OLS1   SFE   
  coefficient t-ratio  coefficient t-ratio  
Intercept ? -1.315 -0.543  -1.317 -0.910  
Assets (natural log) + 0.206 1.347 * 0.206 2.872 *** 
Nr. of reports (natural log) + 0.186 0.798  0.186 0.959  
Nr. of locations (natural log) + 0.239 1.235  0.239 1.506 * 
Opinion type + -0.278 -0.679  -0.278 -0.597  
Foreign proportion of assets + 1.826 1.979 ** 1.826 2.431 *** 
Leverage + 0.582 0.900  0.582 0.911  
First year client + -0.832 -2.701 *** -0.832 -1.018  
Second year client + -0.204 -0.596  -0.204 -0.471  
Third year client + -0.082 -0.200  -0.082 -0.196  
Fourth year client + 0.709 1.747 ** 0.709 1.626 * 
(Receivables + Inventory)/Total assets + -0.342 -0.724  -0.342 -0.787  
Profit margin - -3.172 -2.075 ** -3.172 -2.436 *** 
Nonaudit fee/audit fee - -0.019 -0.199  -0.019 -0.193  
Inherent risk + 0.474 1.360 * 0.474 1.535 * 
Control quality - 0.075 0.340  0.075 0.406  
Loss in last two years + -0.124 -0.286  -0.124 -0.366  
Public + 0.357 1.250  0.357 1.362 * 
        
Overall F-test  19.58 ***     
Adjusted R2  0.27      
Log likelihood constant only  -175.388   -175.388   
Log likelihood model  -148.328   -148.328   
Likelihood ratio test statistic  54.119 ***  54.119 ***  
        
Log likelihood OLS model  -148.328      
Log likelihood SFE model  -148.328      
Likelihood ratio test statistic OLS vs. SFE3  0.000      
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Table 3-continued 
        
Panel D: manager hours        
        
Dependent variable: natural log of manager hours Expected        
Independent variables: sign OLS   SFE   
  coefficient t-ratio  coefficient t-ratio  
Intercept ? -6.501 -2.524 ** -6.511 -2.197 ** 
Assets (natural log) + 0.494 3.353 *** 0.494 3.874 *** 
Nr. of reports (natural log) + 0.300 0.875  0.300 0.965  
Nr. of locations (natural log) + 0.810 2.811 *** 0.810 3.079 *** 
Opinion type + 1.458 1.839 ** 1.458 1.982 ** 
Foreign proportion of assets + 2.033 1.344 * 2.033 1.561 * 
Leverage + -0.458 -0.428  -0.458 -0.466  
First year client + -0.787 -0.618  -0.787 -0.719  
Second year client + -0.163 -0.206  -0.163 -0.227  
Third year client + -0.159 -0.227  -0.159 -0.246  
Fourth year client + -0.309 -0.388  -0.309 -0.427  
(Receivables + Inventory)/Total assets + -0.358 -0.475  -0.358 -0.535  
Profit margin - -1.920 -0.671  -1.920 -0.797  
Nonaudit fee/audit fee - -0.125 -0.706  -0.125 -0.775  
Inherent risk + 0.051 0.094  0.051 0.098  
Control quality - 0.586 1.780 * 0.586 1.949 * 
Loss in last two years + -0.284 -0.476  -0.284 -0.524  
Public + -0.067 -0.143  -0.067 -0.158  
        
Overall F-test  3.90 ***     
Adjusted R2  0.30      
Log likelihood constant only  -234.550   -234.550   
Log likelihood model  -204.592   -204.592   
Likelihood ratio test statistic  59.916 ***  59.916 ***  
        
Log likelihood OLS model  -204.592      
Log likelihood SFE model  -204.592      
Likelihood ratio test statistic OLS vs. SFE3  0.000      
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Table 3-continued 
        
Panel E: supervisor hours        
        
Dependent variable: natural log of supervisor hours Expected        
Independent variables: sign OLS1   SFE   
  coefficient t-ratio  coefficient t-ratio  
Intercept ? -3.733 -1.475  -3.735 -1.623  
Assets (natural log) + 0.410 2.633 *** 0.410 3.953 *** 
Nr. of reports (natural log) + -0.075 -0.293  -0.075 -0.280  
Nr. of locations (natural log) + 0.321 1.312 * 0.321 1.440 * 
Opinion type + -1.481 -1.789 * -1.481 -2.464 ** 
Foreign proportion of assets + -0.304 -0.195  -0.305 -0.268  
Leverage + 1.024 1.409 * 1.024 1.276  
First year client + -1.442 -1.487  -1.442 -1.581  
Second year client + -0.754 -1.105  -0.754 -1.271  
Third year client + 0.350 1.181  0.350 0.634  
Fourth year client + 0.669 1.863 ** 0.669 1.091  
(Receivables + Inventory)/Total assets + 1.198 2.089 ** 1.198 2.076 ** 
Profit margin - -6.095 -2.751 *** -6.095 -2.914 *** 
Nonaudit fee/audit fee - 0.062 0.711  0.062 0.456  
Inherent risk + 0.092 0.259  0.092 0.222  
Control quality - 0.045 0.150  0.045 0.178  
Loss in last two years + 0.427 1.100  0.427 0.925  
Public + 0.091 0.211  0.091 0.242  
        
Overall F-test  6.39 ***     
Adjusted R2  0.27      
Log likelihood constant only  -213.289   -213.289   
Log likelihood model  -185.970   -185.970   
Likelihood ratio test statistic  54.638 ***  54.638 ***  
        
Log likelihood OLS model  -185.970      
Log likelihood SFE model  -185.970      
Likelihood ratio test statistic OLS vs. SFE3  0.000      
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Table 3-continued 
        
Panel F: assistant hours        
        
Dependent variable: natural log of assistant hours Expected        
Independent variables: sign OLS1   SFE   
  coefficient t-ratio  coefficient t-ratio  
Intercept ? 1.660 1.501  1.659 1.678 * 
Assets (natural log) + 0.196 2.925 *** 0.196 4.511 *** 
Nr. of reports (natural log) + 0.174 1.331 * 0.174 1.708 ** 
Nr. of locations (natural log) + 0.253 2.357 *** 0.253 2.958 *** 
Opinion type + -0.086 -0.312  -0.086 -0.361  
Foreign proportion of assets + 0.415 0.710  0.415 0.916  
Leverage + -0.242 -0.661  -0.242 -0.764  
First year client + 0.297 1.409 * 0.297 0.743  
Second year client + -0.297 -1.227  -0.297 -1.274  
Third year client + 0.179 0.880  0.179 0.863  
Fourth year client + 0.256 0.823  0.256 1.079  
(Receivables + Inventory)/Total assets + -0.187 -0.761  -0.187 -0.830  
Profit margin - 0.157 0.141  0.157 0.192  
Nonaudit fee/audit fee - -0.053 -0.746  -0.053 -1.016  
Inherent risk + 0.052 0.238  0.052 0.327  
Control quality - 0.123 1.096  0.123 1.259  
Loss in last two years + 0.429 2.613 *** 0.429 2.445 *** 
Public + 0.042 0.272  0.042 0.304  
        
Overall F-test  7.67 ***     
Adjusted R2  0.44      
Log likelihood constant only  -118.442   -118.064   
Log likelihood model  -75.629   -75.629   
Likelihood ratio test statistic  85.626 ***  84.870 ***  
        
Log likelihood OLS model  -75.629      
Log likelihood SFE model  -75.629      
Likelihood ratio test statistic OLS vs. SFE3  0.000      
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Table 3-continued 
        
Panel G: supporting hours        
        
Dependent variable: natural log of supporting hours Expected        
Independent variables: sign OLS   SFE   
  coefficient t-ratio  coefficient t-ratio  
Intercept ? -3.334 -1.538  -3.340 -1.542  
Assets (natural log) + 0.323 2.604 *** 0.323 3.311 *** 
Nr. of reports (natural log) + 0.134 0.464  0.134 0.508  
Nr. of locations (natural log) + 0.029 0.120  0.029 0.130  
Opinion type + -0.376 -0.564  -0.376 -0.622  
Foreign proportion of assets + -1.273 -1.000  -1.273 -1.164  
Leverage + -0.678 -0.754  -0.678 -0.859  
First year client + 0.373 0.348  0.373 0.406  
Second year client + -0.453 -0.680  -0.453 -0.743  
Third year client + 0.363 0.616  0.363 0.682  
Fourth year client + 0.130 0.195  0.130 0.214  
(Receivables + Inventory)/Total assets + -0.257 -0.407  -0.257 -0.458  
Profit margin - -0.070 -0.029  -0.070 -0.034  
Nonaudit fee/audit fee - -0.281 -1.894 ** -0.281 -2.072 ** 
Inherent risk + 0.210 0.462  0.210 0.496  
Control quality - -0.460 -1.661 ** -0.460 -1.812 ** 
Loss in last two years + 0.072 0.144  0.072 0.157  
Public + -0.213 -0.538  -0.213 -0.594  
        
Overall F-test  1.13      
Adjusted R2  0.02      
Log likelihood constant only  -195.291   -195.183   
Log likelihood model  -184.920   -184.920   
Likelihood ratio test statistic  20.742   20.526   
        
Log likelihood OLS model  -184.920      
Log likelihood SFE model  -184.920      
Likelihood ratio test statistic OLS vs. SFE3  0.000      
        
1 t-statistics are calculated using White's correction for heteroskedasticity 
2 Intercept deleted at the request of the firm providing our data 
3 This test statistic is asymptotically distributed as a mixed χ2-distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions (in this case 
one). For α=0.05, the critical value is 2.71 (Coelli et al. 1998. See Kodde and Palm (1986) for the specific critical values). 
Significance: * p <.10 level , ** p <.05 level, *** p <.01 level (tested one or two tailed, where appropriate) 
Note: coefficients and t-ratios that have a sign opposite to its predicted sign and that are significant at the above-indicated levels are in bold face. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 The term “parties” should be interpreted in a very broad sense. RPE has been applied to individuals, teams, 
organization units and departments, firms, districts, countries and many other cases. 
 
2 A discussion of this paper is provided in the next section. 
 
3 O’Keefe et al (1994) indicate that they do not include capital inputs in their model of audit production “..(…)..because 
we believe that these are of second-order importance.(…)” (O’Keefe et al. 1994, 245). 
 
4 As stated earlier, we believe the measure of audit costs used in the current study presents a more accurate picture of 
the actual audit costs incurred by the audit firm in conducting audit engagements than does the measure of costs used by 
Dopuch et al. (2000). We will elaborate on this issue in a later section. 
 
5 In contrast, ordinary least squares regression techniques assume that the error term consists of random noise only and, 
as stated earlier, are therefore unable to detect possible inefficiencies. 
 
6 The data that were collected during this pilot test are not included in the final data set used in the current study.  
 
7 One response concerned an audit for consolidation purposes, another was a review, a third was a compilation and a 
fourth was a holding company. 
 
8 These model specifications are “…(..) motivated by three basic issues: (1) to highlight the crucial role of client size as 
a determinant of audit effort, (2) to linearize the relationship between labor hours (or audit fees) and client size; and (3) 
to reduce heteroscedasticity. (…)” (Hackenbrack and Knechel 1997, 485).  
 
9 As Dopuch et al. (2000, 8) themselves indicate, a weakness of their surrogate (i.e. standard fees) is that the level of 
costs and standard fees may vary geographically. 
 
10 Alternative, more general distributions have been specified, such as the truncated normal distribution. This 
distribution is a generalization of the half normal distribution in that it is obtained by truncating the normal distribution 
at zero. It has a mean µ and variance σu2. In the case where µ=0, the truncated-normal is equal to the half-normal 
…continued 
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distribution (see Coelli et al. 1998, 200). According to Greene (1997, 104), despite the availability of alternative 
distributional forms, most empirical applications of the stochastic frontier technique have used the half-normal 
distribution for ui. The results we report in this paper are for models with the half-normal distribution. However, we 
have also tested our model using the truncated-normal distribution, and we obtained results that are virtually identical to 
those using the half-normal distribution, suggesting the results are independent of our choice of the distributional form 
of ui.  
 
11 These statistics are not presented here to save space.  
 
12 In fact, a regression of total costs, total audit hours, partner hours, manager hours, supervisor hours, assistant hours 
and supporting hours on (the natural log of) total assets yields an R2 of 0.65, 0.59, 0.25, 0.28, 0.19, 0.40, and 0.07 
respectively. All these models are significant at the 0.01 level (F-test). This confirms prior studies, “..(…)..which have 
shown that client size alone can explain more that 50 percent of cross-sectional variability in audit fee.(…)” 
(Hackenbrack and Knechel 1997, 496).  
 
13 Should auditor learning occur, the signs of the year client indicators are positive and ordered as follows: first year 
client > second year client > third year client > fourth year client (see O’Keefe et al. 1994, 253).  
 
14 These results are not reported here to save space. 
 
15 These tests are performed as one-sided generalized likelihood-ratio tests (Coelli et al. 1998, 191) and are reproduced 
in the bottom of each panel. 
 
16 As discussed earlier, the surrogate cost measure used by Dopuch et al. (2000) differs from the (we believe more 
accurate) measure of audit costs that we use in the current study. 
